How were the effects of America's isolationism and Britains...?

Question:policy of appeasement similar?

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America, through isolationism, ignored the problems of Europe, which affected them in a negative way. After the war Europe was suffering and couldn't compete with the hight tarrifs America were putting on their products so it was impossible to export over there. They ended up having to put up high tarriffs of their own and import cheaper grain from Canada. America suffered from the lack of trade, especially in agriculture where that had been many problems due to new machinery. Similarly by appeasing Hitler they thought they were protecting themselves, in this case by not starting the war. However, by ignoring Hitler and delaying the war, Britain allowed him to grow more powerful and ultimately suffered more due to the long hard years of war, which at the end left Britain no longer one of the super powers.
America also ignored the war til the last moment, they had the power and money to stop it quicker, but they instead merely loaned money and weapons, which was not enough, by entering towars the end they managed to help finish the war in a swifter fashion.
However, while Britain lost money and power due to appeasement, America by the end of the war could call back on loans and had the money from selling weapons and profited from it, along with the jobs it made, which helped solved some of the employment there, being more of a positive effect than negative, unlike Britain's appeasement policy.

Both modes of thought seriously underestimated Hitler. You don't ignore or submit to a bully.

I think this is what you may be looking for:

All international powers must decide how to contend with potential challengers. (1) They must select which states to punish, where to cooperate, and how to allocate national resources between the state's productive capacity and its military security. A state that neglects either fiscal or security interests will have insufficient economic or military means to protect its global interests. That is, allocating too much or too little for defense can be dangerous. Excessive peacetime defense expenditures to keep pace with the military spending of rapidly rising contenders will divert resources from domestic investment, limit the scope of future economic growth, and eventually weaken the productive strength of the hegemon to construct and maintain a modern military force. By allocating too little for defense, the hegemon will lack the military means to deter rising challengers and the capability to defend its extensive global interests, in the event that deterrence fails.

The United States has three blueprints from previous hegemons for how (and how not) to respond to challengers:

The Spanish I (1621-40) response of punishment everywhere. Philip IV and his deputy, Olivares, engaged in total warfare against the Dutch, the French, and the English, as well as against the Ottomans and the Swedes, on several fronts and often simultaneously. Prolonged and excessive spending eroded Spain's fiscal strength and, ultimately, its military power, and the stress from the search for new sources of revenue contributed to revolts in Catalonia and Portugal in 1640.

The British II (1932-39) response of cooperation everywhere. Chamberlain and his supporters moderated the ascents of Germany, Japan, and Italy through economic concessions, arms limitation agreements, and territorial agreements. As a result, Britain's military, industrial, and economic preparations for war were delayed. In addition, the challengers' reneging on or not renewing arms control agreements meant that Britain's military capability was insufficient to defend its global commitments.

The British I (1889-1912) response of selective engagement. Britain cooperated with the United States, France (after 1904), and Japan through devolving leadership, extending loans, reducing protectionism, and assisting in their naval ascents, and it punished imperial Germany, France (until 1904), and Russia through naval building programs, tariffs, and preferential trading arrangements. This strategy ensured that London had ample fiscal and military capability to be a leading player in the great power game.

So what are the lessons of history for perpetuating U.S. predominance? The good news is that Washington is now less likely to select the British II option of cooperation everywhere, which could endanger America's national security. The bad news is that Washington could select the neo-imperial Spanish I path of punishment everywhere (that is, in Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Syria, China, Libya, and Saudi Arabia), which could erode America's economic staying power.

How previous great powers have responded to challengers is driven by the classic domestic question of "who gets what, when, and how?" Foreign policy is the product of the clash between inward-oriented nationalists and outward-leaning internationalists (or what I term economic nationalists and free traders) (Solingen 1998, 64). Broad, logrolled coalitions of actors and special interest groups from government, industry, finance, and labor will converge on a common position, often for different reasons and without any formal organization (Fordham 1998, 8). (2) Supporters and opponents know that the state's response to challengers will create domestic winners and losers. Supporters and opponents also recognize that any changes in the state's foreign policy can have domestic distributional consequences. By capturing the gains and avoiding the losses, the victors will expand their domestic political power to advance their preferred policies, and the vanquished will be weakened politically and economically (Rogowski 1989, 5). As Helen Milner tells us, these "domestic consequences are the 'stuff' of politics" (16).

FREE TRADERS

The free trade coalition consists of internationally competitive sectors and outward-oriented allies. They have overseas investments or interests and benefit from foreign economic exposure, or they have strong international links. Free traders favor greater openness and stability and will press the government to enact policies that promote such market characteristics. Supporters of the free trade coalition include fiscal conservatives, export-oriented and capital intensive firms, large banking and financial services, central banks, smaller firms oriented to global markets, skilled labor, and finance oriented government bureaucracies such as the Treasury or the Ministry of Finance.

The free trade bloc stands for macroeconomic stability both at home and abroad. First, this translates into limited government intervention in the economy, balanced budgets, tight monetary policy, and the deregulation of financial markets and exchange rates. Free trade supporters especially favor reforms to liberalize trade such as the abandonment of public sector trade and production monopolies, the deregulation of trade and currency regimes, and a retreat from state planning. Second, free traders favor reliance on low-cost defense arrangements such as the navy, air force, nuclear weapons, and other labor-saving technology. These arrangements are deemed essential to protect the sea-lanes of communication, trade links, and trade routes to secure imports and exports. Finally, cost-conscious free traders are open to membership in intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), as well as negotiated settlements of disputes and arms control agreements to lower the political, economic, and military costs of preparing for war. Arms races and hostility spirals are especially dangerous, because they will divert resources from productive domestic investment to military spending, undermine prosperity, disrupt trade flows, and contribute to increased protectionism.

ECONOMIC NATIONALISTS

Pitted against the free trade coalition, the economic nationalist bloc is made up of non-internationally competitive sectors and domestic leaning groups. They have few foreign assets, sales, or ties, and they do not compete with foreign imports. The composition of the economic nationalist coalition includes unskilled labor, inefficient industry and agriculture, import-substituting manufacturing, labor intensive industry, public sector managers and workers, the military, settler pressure groups, colonial- and empire-oriented state bureaucrats and civil servants, pro-empire interest groups, small businesses that compete with imports, and trading companies.

Economic nationalists favor a military posture that calls for offensive ground force systems over defensive strategies (increasing the budget, mission, and role of the military). To protect inefficient state industry and infant industry from foreign competition, economic nationalists will lobby for tariffs, duties, and subsidies. They also view state planning as the engine for enhancing import-substituting manufacturing, and they support an active government that controls prices, licensing, purchasing, and wages. They will encourage the collaboration and amalgamation of industry into big business, as well as corporatist labor arrangements to compel labor's cooperation with management and the government. In the past, economic nationalists regarded any colonial and overseas markets as essential for sustaining the policy of self-sufficiency and autarky, which they emphasize for strategic reasons such as the danger of economic dependence and the loss of control over destiny.

COALITIONAL VERSUS NATIONAL INTEREST

The coalitional interest of each bloc is to bolster its own faction's relative power over the opposition. The national interest is to maintain a rough balance between the state's finances and security without undermining its political economy or eroding its military security.

In some states, these interests will converge, and the chosen foreign policy will advance both interests. For ruling free traders that confront liberal contenders (a state with a dominant free trade bloc), cooperation will advance the nation's interests by lowering the cost of hegemony (safeguarding the leader's political economy) and boost its own coalition's power. For reigning economic nationalists that encounter imperial contenders (states with a dominant economic nationalist bloc), punishment will ensure that the state has sufficient military capability to defend its global commitments (protecting the hegemon's national security) and will enhance their faction's strength at the same time.

In other states, the coalitional and national interests will diverge. Ruling free traders will want to cooperate everywhere, even in the face of rogue challenges, but the national interest calls for punishment. Although punishment will insure sufficient military capability, this strategy will meet strong resistance from constituents of the free trade faction, because it will boost economic nationalists who will call for strong-fisted policy everywhere.

Where economic nationalists rule, they will push to punish everywhere, even liberal states where collaboration is possible, but the national interests call for cooperation. Although cooperation will safeguard the hegemon's political economy, economic nationalists will oppose this strategy, because it will strengthen the free trade faction that will press for moderation everywhere. The danger in both instances is that a faction that advances its coalitional interest but

America's isolationism just ignored him and Britain's appeasement gave him whatever he wanted to hope he would stop, but he wouldn't. Neither worked. Then it was time to fight back.