Physicalists, how do you account mental states?

Question:

Physicalists, how do you account mental states?

I can follow the materialists to a point, however, I cannot totally wrap my head around a materialist account of mental states. I don't believe in an immortal soul as my namesake did. But there seems to be a qualitative difference between synaptic connections or C-fiber stimulations and that feeling that I have when eating a nice, juicy steak or downing a tall cold draft beer. Philosophers refer to the experiences that I have when seeing red, tasting beer or steak as qualia. There have been questions on qualia here at YA. I guess I'd just like to know how materialists or physicalists account for qualia or mental states.

Best Answer - Chosen by Asker: The most consistent form of materialism that I have encountered is eliminative materialism. This position holds that all talk of qualia must be eliminated from our philosophical and psychological vocabularies as folk psychology. For example, people in the past used to talk of witches having powers over people's health, such as causing illness and disease in people. We now know that bacteria, viruses, etc. cause these ailments. The elminativist holds that just as we do not ascribe "witchcraft" to offering an explanation for our ailments anymore, likewise we should stop offering talk of "qualia" as an explanation for our mental states.

Of course the eliminativists have a huge problem. So far they have not been able to offer a comprehensive physical understanding of our mental states. They only offer promisory notes toward future research.